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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Sheldon v. George, 132 App. Div. 470, 116 N. Y. S. 969; Couch v. State, 14 N. D.
361, 103 N. W. 942; Stamper v. Temple, 25 Tenn. (6 Humph.) 113; Broadnax
v. Ledbetter, 100 Tex. 375; Tobin v. McComb, 156 S. W. (Tex. C. A.) 237;
Choice v. City of Dallas, 210 S. W. (Tex. C. A.) 753; Reif v. Paige, 55 Wis.
496, 13 N. W. 473.
The dissenting opinion in the case under discussion follows what by many
Americans is supposed to be the line of reasoning of the early case of Williams
v. Carwardine, 4 Barn. & Adolph. 621. The offer is construed as a general
promise to anyone who performs the act. If the one offering the reward se-
cures that for which 'the reward was offered, an obligation to pay is created
regardless of the motives of the claimant. This doctrine is based on the theory
that no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of an-
other. It denies that the relationship created is strictly contractual, but im-
poses instead a quasi-contractual obligation on the part of him who has been
enriched. This is indeed a dangerous doctrine. For if a person can recover a
reward which has been offered but of which he has no knowledge, or which
he does not at that time intend to accept, it is equally true that he can recover
a reward when none in fact has been offered. Reeder v. Anderson, 4 Dana
193. A promise not known or relied upon is the same as no promise at all. The
same obligation to pay would rest upon the person for whom the service was
rendered. If such a doctrine is upheld there would be a legal obligation resting
on men to reward their neighbors for every friendly office they may bestow, a
policy which should not be encouraged. (See 62 Cent. L. J. 105.) However,
the following cases deny that the essentials of a binding contract are necessary
for the recovery of a reward, holding that knowledge of the offer and intent
to claim are not requisite to a recovery. Eagle v. Smith, 4 Houston (Del.) 293;
Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199; Sullivan v. Phillips, 178 Ind. 164; Board v.
Davis, 162 Ind. 60; Everman v. Hyman, 26 Ind. App. 165, 28 N. E. 1022; Auditor
v, Ballard, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 572; Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170; Drummond v.
U. S., 35 Ct. Cl. 356.
A few jurisdictions have had occasion to distinguish between rewards offered
by individuals and corporations and those arising by statute or court record in
such a manner as to make it clear that the offer is not an offer to contract but
the creation of a legal right to exist when a particular act is performed, regard-
less of contract. In these cases notice of such an offer is not necessary before
recovery. State v. Smith, 38 Nev. 477, 151 Pac. 512; Choice v. Dallas, 210 S. W.
(Tex. C. A.) 753. There is ample justification for this distinction. However,
it seems evident that the case of Arkansas Bankers' Association v. Lignon,
supra, based on the theory of contract, follows the best rule in cases of this
nature. F. A. E., '28.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-STATUTORY DmSION AMONG HEIRS OF PRE-
DECEASED SPousE.-Plaintiffs, Margaret Russell, representing the heirs of the
first predeceased husband of one Annie Milne, and Harold and Florence Chase,
constituting the heirs of the second predeceased husband of Annie Milne filed
a joint petition against defendant, Charles Nelson, beneficiary under the will of
the said Annie Milne to contest the validity of the will. Defendant by way of
demurrer specified that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, alleging that
the heirs of the first deceased husband of intestate had no interest in her estate.
Deceased died leaving no descendants. The kindred of both the predeceased
husbands of intestate claim an interest in the estate by virtue of Section 305, Re-
vised Statutes of Missouri, 1919, which reads: "If there be no . . . descend-
ants . . . capable of inheriting, the whole (estate) shall go to the kindred
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of the wife or husband of the intestate . . . :' The court sustained the de-
murrer, held the will void, and that the deceased's property by the above statute
descended to the kindred of only the last of the two deceased husbands of intes-
tate. Russell et al. v. Nelson et al., 295, S. W. 118 (Mo. 1927).
It was the general rule at common law that the death of one spouse terminated
all privileges and obligations peculiar to the marital relationship. Booker v.
Small, 147 Ga. 566, 94 S. E. 999; Piper v. May, 51 Ind. 283. The statute in the
instant case in abrogation of the common law rule permits the descent of
property to the surviving heirs of a deceased spouse under certain circum-
stances.
If the meaning of a statute is doubtful then recourse may be had by the courts
to considerations of public policy. Jersey City Gas Light Co. v. Consumers Gas
Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 427, 2 At. 922; Opinion of Justices, 7 Mass. 523; to considera-
tions of reasonableness and disastrous consequences, Meredith v. United States,
13 Pet. 486, 10 U. S. (L. Ed.) 258; Pickering v. Ray, 3 Houst. (Del.) 479.
When necessary to give effect to legislative intent, words importing the singular
number only, will be construed to include the plural of persons and things.
People v. Aurora, 84 Ill. 157; Ellis v. Whitlock, 10 Mo. 78.
Had the Missouri Court in the instant case pluralized the words "husband and
wife" it would have covered the case of the existence of more than one surviv-
ing spouse by an intestate, a fact opposed to public policy. In the light of
precedented authority it appears that the Missouri Court was justified in its in-
terpretation of the instant statute. J. R. B., '28.
FoRGERY-UsE OF ONE'S OWN NAME WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD.-Action on a
forgery bond. Plaintiffs alleged that they were defrauded by act of depositor
in giving check on other bank wherein he had a small account in an assumed
name, said assumed name or alias being signed to check. Held, defendant liable
because act of depositor amounted to forgery. International Union Bank v.
National Surety Co., 157 N. E. 269 (N. Y. 1927).
The ultimate question is whether or not one can commit forgery by the use
of his own name with intent to defraud. The case under discussion is amply
fortified by prior New York decisions, wherein it seems to be the settled rule
that forgery may be committed even though the accused used his own name.
The New York doctrine seems to be approved generally only where the maker
intended to personate, or incur a pecuniary liability against, someone else bear-
ing the same name. Edwards v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 50, 108 S. W. 673. In the
absence of intent to impersonate another of the same name, the trend of de-
cisions seems to lie that the crime of forgery has not been consummated, and
the crime, if any, is obtaining money under false pretenses. State v. Wheeler,
20 Ore. 192, 25 Pac. 394; Heavy v. Bank, 27 Utah 222, 75 Pac. 727; Murphy v.
State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 488, 93 S. W. 543. The present case was, in reality, de-
cided on what were held to be common law principles because the New York
statute appears to be a mere codification of the common law in this respect.
More stress seems to have been placed on the intent than on the act, in fact it
appears that the intent was all conclusive.
An early English case held it not forgery for a person to sign an instrument,
the subject of forgery, in his own name, although it be of a false affirmation,
unless the name written was used in such a way as to place the burden of the
obligation upon another person bearing the same name. Reg. v. White, 2 C. &
K. 404, 61 E. C. L. 404. This seems to be the general doctrine throughout the
United States. Harrison v. State, 72 Ark. 117, 78 S. W. 763; Barron v. State,
77 S. E. 214 (Ga. 1913); Harris v. State, 98 So. 316 (Ala. 1923). The above
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